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lN TIIE SUPREME COURT OF TI-IE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Tn the interest of 
PRISBREY, DAVID (6/3/59) 
A person under eighteen years of age. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
No. 15312 
This case seeks to determine whether the proclamation of the Governor 
establishing a maximum 55 MPH speed limit expired by its own terms prior 
to the date of the alleged violation by the driver. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge John Farr Larson determined that the 55 MPH maximum speed limit 
established by the Utah Governor on January 2, 1974, was still in effect on 
December 8, 1976. He found the charge against the driver to be true and 
assessed a fine. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the SSMPH maximum speed limit established by 
the proclamation of the Utah Governor on January 2, 1974, determined by the 
Supreme Court to have expired by its own terms prior to December 8, 1976. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The youthful driver in this case was driving home from work on December 
8, 1976. He had entered Interstate l.S headed South from the Fifth South on-
ramp in Salt Lake City. The driver was stopped by a Highway Patrol Officer 
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and referred to the Juvenile Court for exceeding the posted 55 MPH limit. 
The attorney for the young person filed a motion to dismiss supported 
by a memorandum of authorities. The Juvenile Court ruled against the con 
tention of the driver that the 55 mile rule had no force and effect on the 8th 
day of CE'cember, 1976. The Court assessed a fine against the driver and 
the driver appealed. 
POINT I 
THE PROCLAMATION OF THE GOVERNOR OF JANUARY 2, 1974, EX-
PIRED ON THE BASIS OF ITS OWN PREMISES PRIOR TO DECEMBER 8, 19 
The Governor in Utah does not have law making power under the Consti 
tution of Utah. By Article VI, Section 1 of the constitution the legislative 
power is vPsted in the legislature and in the people if they exercise the init 
tive or referendum. 
During World War II the Legislature gave power to the Governor to pro 
claim speed limits to fonform to the recommendations of federal authority 
time of war or national emergency. This grant of authority is embodied in 
Section 41-6-46 (4) of the Utah Code. 
This is not a transfer of the power of the legislature to make law. Sud 
would be an unlawful delegation of legislative power. This statute essentia: 
gives the Governor administrative rule making power to conform with feder 
recommendations upon his determination that there is a war or national ef11 
gency and there is a recommendation of federal authorities. 
On January 2, 1974, the Utah Governor did issue a proclamation. It wa 
the usual proclamation form. It contained whereas clauses. The first whe 
clause referred to Section 41-6-46 (4) of the Utah Code. The second where 
clause had its foundation in H. R. 11372 of January 2, 1974. 
These whereas clauses constitute the logical premises on which the ope 
..., 
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tive language of the proclamation is based. They take the place of the usual 
fact findings of traditional rule making procedures. 
rJ· R. 11372 did not declare a national emergency. It declared a fuel 
conservation policy during a period of current and imminent fuel shortage. 
It used the power of the federal purse to coerce state action to adopt a 55 
MPH rule in conformity with the fuel shortage problem. It gave the states 
60 days to adopt the limit before the federal bucks would be cut off. 
This opportunity suited Governor Rampton. He had proposed a 55 mile 
limit for urban areas theretofore but his proposal didn't take with the Road 
Commission or others having powers with respect to speed limits. He 
issued the proclamation almost before the ink was dry on Richard Nixon's 
signature on H. R. 11372. 
A budget session of the Utah Legislature was set to convene within two 
weeks. The budget session could have considered the problem and dealt 
with it inasmuch as it involved important fiscal matters involving the flow 
of federal highway money into and out of the state coffers. 
The Governor made his move after attributing national emergency status 
to the fuel shortage circumstances. 
The Utah Supreme Court sustained the proclamation of the Governor not-
withstanding its own observations that the energy crisis was probably not as 
serims as forecasted. State vs. Foukas, Case NO). 1413.S, filed January 24, 
1977. What that case did not tell us was whether the proclamation continued 
to have validity after its uncertain emergency character at its inception. 
H. R. ll372hadanexpirationdateofJune30, 197.S. H. R.11372was 
repPaied by Public Law 93-643, Section 154 of Title 23 of the United States 
Code. This act was approved January 4, 1975. 
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The statutory foundation of the proclamation of the Governor was there! 
destroyed by Act of Congress on January 4, 1975. 
The federal government kept to its policy of a national 5.5 mile limit 
but all references to national emergency or fuel shortage were deleted. Tl 
new legislation required state action pursuant to the new statute. No new 
action sanctioned by Utah law was taken after January 4, 1975. 
In any event the original federal statute defining the fuel shortage as its 
premise for federal funding control would have expired by its own terms on 
June 30, 1975. There could have been no valid effect for the Governor's Ru 
after the termination date of the federal statute on which the Governor pre· 
mised his action. 
This state of affairs leads logically to this question: Does a proclamat 
of the Governor acquire an independent life of its own that can go on foreve 
irrespective of changes of circumstance that prompted the proclamation? 
It was the position of the trial judge in this case that the proclamation 
would go on forever unless the Governor himself made a new declaration o: 
repeal. 
On the other hand, Judge Christofferson of the District Court of Box Eli 
County has taken the other position and has ruled that the proclamation is r 
longer effective because the Arab oil embargo no longer exists. Judge 
Christofferson so ruled in the case of State Vs. Mansfield, Criminal No. 
1722 in the District Court of Box Elder County on August 15, 1977. A notice 
of appeal has been filed by the Box Elder County Attorney and should be 
pending in rte Supreme Court shortly. The Court will thus be confronted 
with contrary decisions on this issue from the trial courts. 
In this respect it is worth noting that H. R. 11372 itself was framed in 
4 
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temporary terms. Section 2 (e) of the Act provided that the act would no longer 
be effective on the date when the President should declare that there was no 
longer a fuel shortage or June 30, 1975, whichever should occur first. 
The legislation was not even passed in a permanent form. It was passed 
as a resolution and signed by the President but was not even codified in the 
U. S. Code. The new permanent legislation is codified as Section 154 of 
Title 23 but it is adopted as a matter of ongoing national policy with no 
reference to any emergency. 
While it is now generally recognized that there must be long term adjust-
ments in energy usage in this country, the plans for the adjustments are gen-
erally aiming at supply problems in the mid-nineteen eighties. In the absence 
of sudden interruption of supply no petroleum crisis is expected until that time. 
It is the national plan to ease out of heavy petroleum reliance so that the 
crisis may never arrive. 
In the meantime it is the proper function of the Legislature to make 
permanent laws. There have been four scheduled meetings of the Utah 
Legislature since H. R. 11372 became effective. There have been one or 
more special sessions since that time. TheLegislature could have taken 
permanent action if it had been so inclined. 
Actually, the Legislature did enact 55 mile legislation in the 1977 
Regular sEssion. but it was vetoed by the Governor. This legislation was 
H. B. 79. 
We are left in the highly unusual circumstance of a legislature having 
made an effort to comply with the federal statute vetoed by a governor while 
a governor's proclamation is being enforced by the executive branch and some 
1 't the courts. Whatever virtuous motivations the Governor may have or the 
5 
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Legislature may have, the effect of the present posture is that the executivt 
says we do it my way or not at all. We are thus left in a posture, if the 
Supreme Court holds the 55 mile proclamation to still be effective, where 
the Governor makes the law and the Legislature is not permitted to. 
I do not mean to impugn two good governors and many conscientious 
legislators. But we have arrived at a circumstance where we are following 
neither the letter nor the spirit of our State Constitution. Article V Sectior 
1 of the Constitution of Utah provides that the powers of the government of 
the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legis 
lative, the Executive and the Judicial and no person charged with the exerc1 
of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise a; 
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in cases herein expre 
directed or permitted. 
While th~ action of the Governor of January 2, 1974, has been sustained 
by the Supreme Court, it is best that the public action which might be prop: 
in time of crisis should not be allowed to run beyond its proper time to the 
detriment of our constitutional system. The Supreme Court should deterrn 
that the Governor's proclamation became null and void On January 4, 1975' 
June 30, 1975. Better logic would suggest the use of the date when H. R. L 
was repealed on January 4, 1975. 
POINT II 
THE SPEED LIMIT RULE DEBACLE HAS CREATED A SITUATION 
WHERE NO DRIVER CAN KNOW WHAT LAW IS VIOLATED AND 
AN ACCUSED IS THUS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
The Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret News of Wednesday, August 2-!, 19' 
carried stories to the effect that the Attorney General had advised highwa 
patrolmen in the First Judicial District to write speed tickets carrying ini1 
mation such that Justice Courts and City Courts could treat the citation as 
6 
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charging an accused with either violation of the Governor's proclamation 
or the prima facie speed law. This compounds the confusion surrounding 
the 55 mile rule. There should be no difference in one district from what 
goes on elsewhere in the state. The law, whatever it is, is the same state-
wide and should be enforced the same way statewide. We are not dealing with 
a pornography case where some local standards may be applied. 
This procedure is especially bad because it leaves the public grossly 
confused. The proclamation of the Governor is either valid or it is not 
valid. Policemen, prosecutors and judges should not be offered a smorgas-
bord from which they can select a basis for a charge. Due process requires 
that the accused should know of the claim against him without being subjected 
to a game of official roulette in looking for a legal peg to hang a charge on. 
If the Legislature had made the law, there would be no need for every police-
man, prosecutor or judge to make the law. 
While this current recommendation of the Attorney General has no bearing 
on this case, it is symptomatic of what has been happening all along. After 
the proclamation of the Governor, someone in official circles must have had 
some doubt. On January 25, 1974, the State Road Commission approved a 
resolution declaring a 55 MPH rule pursuant to Section 27-12-121 of the 
Utah Code. The Highway Commission moved again in 1975 after the repeal 
of H. R. ll372. On May 23, 1975, it again resolved that the speed limit 
should be 55 MPH at a maximum pursuant to Section 27-12-121 of the Utah 
C:ode and reciting the Act of Congress of January 4, 1975. 
In the case before Judge Christofferson, the Mansfield case, Judge 
Chri.stofferson had originally ruled that Mansfield could be tried on a 55 mile 
rule, but that the 55 mile limit would be a prim a fac ie limit. In doing so he 
expressed his approval of a learned memorandum of th'= Honorable Bryant H. 
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Croft, dated March 17, 1975, in the District Court of Salt Lake County. Tr 
memorandum resulted from the cases of State ve. Andreini and State Vs. f 
Cr. Nos. 27436 and 2703-L Judge Croft ruled that the proclamation of the 
Governor was invalid but that he considered the action of the Road Commis 
having established a 55 MPH prima facie speed limit. 
After the Supreme Court Ruling in the Foukas case, the complaint 
against Mansfield was amended to charge him with a violation of the Goven 
Proclamation which Judge Christofferson then ruled was no longer effective 
In another case before Judge Cornaby of the Layton City Court, the Jud[ 
followed the Croft theory with his own variation that while the 55 MPH rule 
was a prima facie rule, that the State would have the burden of proving the 
unreasonableness of speed in excess of 55 MPH. This was in the c"as e of 
State Vs. Mansfield, no case number. The decision was dated December! 
1975. The state then declined to proceed in the case and the case was dror 
Recent news storied tell of Provo City Judges disposing of 55 MPH case 
as fuel wasting cases because of their concern with the 55 MPH rule. 
The point of this recitation is that the official action of the Governor 
and the Highway Commission has created a situation of legal chaos such th 
these learned judges have all come up with an array of different results th: 
demonstrate that it has been inherently impossible for anyone to know what 
the speed limit has been during various times since January 2, 1974. If 
these gooo judges could come up with their varying reactions to the 55 MPr 
rule, where is the average citizen to find simple, clear guidelines as to 
what the speed law was in Utah. 
An inherently vague state of affairs has resulted which demonstrates 
the vague nature of the rule. This makes the rule roid for vagueness unde 
8 
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Article J Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and under Amendments V and XIV 
of the Federal Constitution. 
POINT III 
THE STATE ITSELF APPARENTLY DOESN'T REALLY BELIEVE 
THAT THE GOVERNOR'S PROCLAMATION rs VALID 
On the 26th day of August, 1977, the Highway Commission passed an 
emergency resolution establishing a new 55 MPH rule. They presumably 
based the rule on certain data from the Federal Department of Transpor-
tation which tended to show that their had been fewer road deaths since the 
55 Mile Rule had been in effect. This was apparently a pretense at coming 
up with a prima facie 55 Mile Rule based on some sort of traffic study. 
The action was apparently a holding action to keep the public from driving 
faster until the next Legislature can meet and take care of the problem. 
This action of the Commission is undoubtedly void and is undoubtedly based 
on its fear of losing federal funds rather than on a reasoned reaction to 
highway safety 
The point of this reference, however, is that the State itself apparently 
does not really believe the Governor's Proclamation to still be in effect and 
has rushed in to fill its pending financial vacuum. 
CONCWSION 
The Supreme Court should reverse the decision of the Second District 
Juvenile Court and direct dismissal of the charge against the young person. 
Respectfully submitted 
GRANT M. PRISBREY 
Attorney For Appellant 
I hereby certify that I delivered copies of this brief to the office 
----
of the Attornev General on the day of , 1977. 
- -~- ----------
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